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THE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S OPINION IN INTEL V COMMISSION: 






The Opinion recently delivered by Advocate General Wahl in Intel v Commission 
(“the Opinion”) invites the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”) to “refine its case-law 
relating to the abuse of a dominant position” under Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU (“TFEU”).1  In particular, AG Wahl suggests that the CJEU should: (i) 
adopt an interpretation of the case-law that considers most of the distinctions drawn between 
categories of rebates in the CJEU “line of authority devolving from Hoffman-La Roche” to be 
irrelevant;2 (ii) consider all rebates offered by dominant firms other than quantity rebates 
(“volume-based rebates”) to be presumptively unlawful;3 and (iii) determine, in light of “all 
the circumstances”,4 whether such rebates are capable of having anticompetitive effects, and 
therefore should be deemed unlawful under Article 102 TFEU.   
The Opinion is not unambitious.  It proposes that the Court align the analytical 
treatment of rebates granted by dominant firms with the “object” and “effect” framework 
found in the wording of Article 101 TFEU, despite the absence of any express reference to 
those concepts in the wording of Article 102 TFEU.5  Moreover, the Opinion addresses the 
delicate issue of the aims of EU competition law.  It argues that, given its “economic 
character,” EU competition law must be viewed as a set of rules that aim “to enhance 
efficiency”.6 
In doing so, the Opinion essentially invites the Court to return to first principles and 
inject common sense into the law of Article 102 TFEU, in the wake of the evolution started 
by Post Danmark I and Post Danmark II.7   This can be understood through eight key points, 
the common thread of which is a concern to ensure legal coherence and economic reason in 
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the application of Article 102 TFEU.  This brief commentary highlights those eight points, 
and suggests that some should be taken even further than AG Wahl proposes.   
 
1. An Effects Analysis underpins Hoffman-La Roche  
Proponents of the status quo in the area of Article 102 TFEU rely on the 1979 
judgment of the Court in Hoffman-La Roche to dismiss any possibility of analysing “fidelity 
rebates” under an effects-based approach.8 
In Hoffman-La Roche, the Court ruled at paragraph 89 of its judgment that, in the 
absence of an objective justification, fidelity rebates are to be deemed presumptively 
unlawful, without any need to examine their effects:  
“An undertaking which is in a dominant position on a market and ties purchasers — even if it 
does so at their request — by an obligation or promise on their part to obtain all or most of 
their requirements exclusively from the said undertaking abuses its dominant position within 
the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty, whether the obligation in question is stipulated 
without further qualification or whether it is undertaken in consideration of the grant of a 
rebate”.9 
 
This statement was repeated verbatim by the General Court (“GC”) in Intel v 
Commission,10 and has given rise to the extant appeal before the CJEU. 
One of the Opinion’s most important contributions is its refutation of the very idea that 
Hoffman-La Roche precludes an assessment of the effects of fidelity rebates.  Acknowledging 
that in Hoffman-La Roche the Court did not explicitly mention at paragraph 89 “the need to 
consider all the circumstances” to establish whether there is an abuse, the Opinion asks the 
reader to consider the subsequent paragraphs of the ruling.  There, one finds a “thorough 
analysis of, inter alia, the conditions surrounding the grant of the rebates and the market 
coverage thereof”.11  Further, the Opinion invites the reader to carry on, and examine the 
subsequent case-law on the application of Article 102 to rebates.  AG Wahl finds that 
although all these subsequent judgments repeat paragraph 89 of Hoffman-La Roche, they 
follow the same approach and go on to consider “all the circumstances” surrounding the grant 
of the rebates.12 
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The careful analysis conducted in the Opinion casts doubt on the misconceived notion 
that “in the absence of an objective justification, the use of exclusivity rebates by dominant 
undertakings is prohibited under Article 102 TFEU”.13  It shows that, on the contrary, the 
necessary analysis of effects is inherent in the Hoffman-La Roche judgment and the case-law 
devolving from it.  We will add that the reading of the French version of the judgment, which 
was the working language of the Court in 1979, confirms AG Wahl’s analysis.  Paragraph 90 
of the French text of Hoffman-La Roche states that fidelity rebates “tendent à enlever à 
l’acheteur, ou à restreindre dans son chef, la possibilité de choix en ce qui concerne ses 
sources d’approvisionnement”.  This should be translated as fidelity rebates “tend to deprive 
the purchaser of or restrict possible sources of supply,” which is very different from the 
erroneous official English version of paragraph 90 of Hoffmann-La Roche, which says that 
such practices “are designed to deprive the purchaser of or restrict his possible choices of 
sources”.14   
 
2. Category and “Super-Category” Mistakes 
In Intel v Commission, the GC created a strict and novel typology of rebates under 
Article 102 TFEU, and associated a specific legal standard to each of the category of rebates it 
identified.  The GC proposed that a distinction be drawn between: (i) “quantity rebates,” 
deemed presumptively lawful;15 (ii) “exclusivity rebates” – rebates conditional on the 
customer obtaining all or most of its requirements from the dominant firm –, deemed 
presumptively unlawful;16 and (iii) rebates not “directly linked to a condition of exclusive or 
quasi-exclusive supply”, which should be examined in light of “all the circumstances”.17 In 
support of the GC’s distinction, a Commission official noted that “all human thinking involves 
categorization”.18  
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The Opinion is also a sober reminder that all human thinking is subject to error.  
Building on its interpretation of Hoffman-La Roche as a ruling which, in spirit if not in 
substance, requires an analysis of effects, the Opinion reaches the logical conclusion that 
“there is no separate category of exclusivity rebates” subject to a strict rule of per se 
illegality.19  According to AG Wahl, there are only two categories of rebates under Article 102 
TFEU: “volume based rebates”, which are presumptively lawful,20 and “loyalty rebates, 
including but not limited to those termed by the General Court ‘exclusivity rebates’”, which 
require an assessment of “all the circumstances”. 
What is even worse, notes the Opinion, is that the GC compounded its erroneous 
analysis by going “one step further”, adding to this first error another one, namely a 
categorisation error.21  As we wrote elsewhere in 2014, the Intel court augmented the second 
category of rebates (“exclusivity rebates”) by including in it not only “exclusivity obligations” 
– where A commits contractually to buying all or most of its product requirements from 
dominant firm B in return for a benefit – but also “exclusivity options” – where, if A buys all 
or most of its product requirements from B, A will receive a benefit (financial or non-
financial).   
The nuance between an exclusivity obligation and an exclusivity option is critical.  On 
its face, an exclusivity obligation can be presumed to generate exclusivity – because the 
contract that provide for it can be enforced by the dominant company. An exclusivity option, 
by contrast, cannot be presumed to result in exclusivity because the customer can walk away 
from the rebate, i.e. divert its purchases to another supplier. An analysis of its effects is 
always necessary to establish the existence of any exclusivity. 
In Post Danmark II, a perceptive CJEU captured this important insight.  It noted at 
paragraph 28 that loyalty rebates cover “an obligation for, or promise by, purchasers to 
obtain all or a given proportion of their supplies” from a dominant firm.22  In other words, the 
term loyalty rebates is reserved to exclusivity obligations. In contrast, financial incentives, 
rebates schedules and discount scales are exclusivity options that require an assessment that 
takes into account “all the circumstances”. 
Against this backdrop, AG Wahl’s Opinion and the Court’s ruling in Post Danmark II 
offer two distinct approaches for the assessment of loyalty rebates under Article 102 TFEU.  
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The Opinion argues that there are only two categories of rebates: volume-based rebates, 
which are presumptively lawful on the one hand, and all other loyalty rebates, which are 
presumptively unlawful and require an assessment of “all the circumstances” on the other 
hand.  The Post Danmark II court suggests that a distinction be drawn between three 
categories of rebates: (i) exclusivity obligations, which are presumptively unlawful; (ii) 
exclusivity options and other financial incentives, which must be considered in light of “all 
the circumstances”; and (iii) quantity rebates, which are presumptively lawful. 
Which of those two categorisation systems is the most sound is far from clear.  Let us 
outline some trade-offs.   The Opinion suggests an effects-based assessment for all cases, and 
will thus delight the exponents of the so-called “more economic” approach.  At the same time, 
the Opinion repeatedly declares that all loyalty rebates are “presumptively unlawful”.  With 
this, the Opinion suggests the existence of a form-based prima facie abuse and seems to shift 
the burden of proof to the dominant firm.  The many parallels found in the Opinion with the 
“near equivalent” concept of “object” under Article 101 TFEU is telling.23  If this logic is 
right, then the Opinion implies that the assessment of “all the circumstances” is essentially a 
means of defence for the dominant firm, not an evidentiary burden to be discharged by 
competition agencies and/or complainants.   
Post Danmark II, in contrast, is stricter in its treatment of exclusivity obligations 
contained in agreements concluded by dominant firms, but more lenient on exclusivity 
options negotiated by such firms (rebates schedules, financial incentives, discount scales, 
etc.), which are not treated as prima facie abuses.  To some extent, Post Danmark II thus 
seems more aligned with the effects-based analysis that the Opinion calls for.24  
 
3. The Non Sequitur of Exclusivity = Exclusion  
The Opinion shines light on several non sequiturs that vitiate not only the GC 
judgment but also much of the antiquated, traditional Article 102 TFEU case-law.  There are 
two aspects to consider here.  The first, which is discussed in this section, is the false 
consequential relation between exclusivity and exclusion.  The Opinion rightly observes that 
the “assumption that exclusivity rebates … result always, and without exception, in 
anticompetitive foreclosure permeates the entire judgment under appeal”.25  It also notes from 
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the outset that the “fate” of the appeal depends to a large extent on whether the CJEU finds 
this assumption to be correct.26 
The origins of this assumption can be traced back to Hoffman-La Roche and its 
progeny.  Those judgments repeat that it is abusive to “remove or restrict the purchaser’s 
freedom to choose his sources of supply, and to deny other producers access to the market”.27  
Paul Nihoul, one proponent of this view, gives a fuller version: “the effect of exclusivity-
based rebates is to compel clients not to deal with competitors; to impede competitors from 
dealing with clients; and to prevent clients from choosing the products or services best 
corresponding to their needs”.28  For the purposes of this discussion, we will call this the 
“HLR” statement. 
The Opinion carefully avoids challenging the merits of the HLR statement.29  Instead, 
it provides from the outset a teleological argument based on the goals of EU competition law, 
noting that “EU competition rules seek to capture behaviour that has anticompetitive 
effects”.30   
We hope that the following reasons will convince the CJEU to look deeper into the 
logic of the HLR statement and its offspring.  First, the HLR statement contains a fallacy of 
petitio principia.  When it says that loyalty rebates “remove or restrict the purchaser’s 
freedom to choose”, it focuses on the post hoc situation of a purchaser who has taken a rebate.  
It therefore ignores the simple fact that it may be the purchaser’s exercise of its freedom to 
choose that led him pre hoc to buy the dominant firm’s products, and take an “exclusivity-
based” rebate.31   
Second, the HLR statement is vitiated by a fallacy of composition.  This logical 
problem arises when one infers that what is true of the part of the whole must be true of the 
whole. The HLR statement says that loyalty rebates “remove or restrict the purchaser’s 
freedom to choose”, and in turn suggests that such rebates “deny other producers access to the 
market”.  Let us accept – subject to the abovementioned fallacy – that one purchaser’s 
freedom to buy from other producers is restricted by a loyalty rebate offered by a dominant 
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firm.  It does not follow that those other producers’ access to the whole market is restricted.  
For example, consider a dominant firm with a 75% market share.  Assume that it applies an 
exclusivity rebate to a customer that covers 1% of the relevant market.  99% of the market 
would remain available to other producers, and this is regardless of the 75% market share of 
the dominant firm.   
Third, the HLR statement is vitiated by a bias of causal determinism.  This logical 
mistake arises when one infers a conclusion as to the cause of a determined situation just by 
looking at it, and fails to consider other causes that may produce the same result.  Here, this 
fallacy arises because it is said that the purchaser’s freedom of choice and rivals’ market 
access are restricted by exclusivity rebates, when it is equally true that any purchase from a 
dominant firm restricts one’s freedom of choice and rivals’ market access, even in the absence 
of any rebate. 
We hope that the Court will agree to look into the merits of the HLR statement, and 
refrain, in future rulings, from any reference to its flawed logic.  We do not believe that this 
requires a revolution.  In fact, the Court’s seminal ruling in Société La Technique Minière 
demonstrated already in 1966 that exclusivity does not necessarily result in exclusion.  In an 
undeservedly forgotten dictum, the Court stated that: 
“in order to decide whether an agreement containing a clause granting an exclusive right of 
sale ' is to be considered as prohibited by reason of its object or of its effect, it is appropriate 
to take into account in particular the nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of the products 
covered by the agreement, the position and importance of the grantor and the concessionaire 
on the market for the products concerned, the isolated nature of the disputed agreement or, 
alternatively, its position in a series of agreements, the severity of the clauses intended to 
protect the exclusive dealership or, alternatively, the opportunities allowed for other 
commercial competitors in the same products by way of parallel re-exportation and 
importation” . 
 
Of course, the reference to Société La Technique Minière could be criticised on the 
grounds that the case concerned the analysis of agreements under Article 101 TFEU.  
However, the weakness of this argument can be exposed with a simple example.  Consider a 
case in which a dominant undertaking offers to a customer a contract that provides for 
exclusivity rebates.  The contract is litigated before a national court under both Article 101 
and 102 TFEU.32  The national court finds that the exclusivity covers 1% of the market, and 
states in its judgment that there is no infringement of Article 101 TFEU because the 
agreement does not appreciably restrict competition.  The national court, however, proceeds 
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to affirm liability under Article 102 TFEU on the ground that the contract restricts 
competition within the meaning of the HLR statement.  How can the same contract restrict 
and not restrict competition at the same time, depending on the provision of the TFEU under 
which it is examined?  
 
4. The Non Sequitur that Any Exclusionary Effect is Anticompetitive 
The second non sequitur besetting the GC’s judgment in Intel v Commission is the 
idea that a dominant undertaking has a special responsibility not to exclude competitors, 
because exclusion by a dominant undertaking is anticompetitive.  
In this respect, the Opinion is right to recall that “not every exit from the market is 
necessarily a sign of abusive conduct, but rather a sign of aggressive, yet healthy and 
permissible, competition”.33  The Court has already recognised the important nuance between 
anticompetitive and procompetitive exclusion in Post Danmark I, holding that: “[n]ot every 
exclusionary effect is necessarily detrimental to competition. Competition on the merits may, 
by definition, lead to the departure from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that 
are less efficient and so less attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other 
things, price, choice, quality or innovation”.34 
This viewpoint is shared throughout the field of economics, and not only by 
mainstream “(post-)Chicago (consumer) welfarist” economists. 35  Even heterodox 
economists like Friedrich Hayek, joint recipient of the 1974 Nobel Prize in Economics, 
recognise that dominant undertakings should be entitled to exclude rivals: “A monopoly based 
on superior efficiency, on the other hand, does comparatively little harm so long as it is 
assured that it will disappear as soon as anyone else becomes more efficient in providing 
satisfaction to the consumers”.36 
In addition to the above, we wish to make one further argument based on coherence.  
An interpretation of Article 102 TFEU that would hold that all conduct that produces an 
exclusionary effect on a rival is abusive would prohibit precisely what the antitrust laws seek 
to persuade dominant undertakings to do, i.e. to leave the “luxurious bed” provided by their 
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entrenched position and jump into the “frying pan” of market competition.37  To put things 
differently: if a dominant undertaking is indiscriminately deprived of the right to marginalise 
rivals through both anti and pro-competitive means, then it is subject to a wholesale 
prohibition against competing with them.  If all competitive conduct by a dominant 
undertaking is forbidden, then this is equivalent to regarding the mere holding of a dominant 
position as being unlawful. 
 
5. Capability, Likelihood and Probability Standards 
The Opinion discusses the concept of the “capability” of a practice carried out by a 
dominant undertaking to restrict competition.  This issue arises because the Commission and 
the GC considered that exclusivity rebates have, by their very nature, anticompetitive 
effects.38  Yet, both proceeded, “in the alternative”, to assess whether Intel’s impugned 
practices were capable of foreclosing competitors.  
To date, the CJEU has provided little guidance on the appropriate legal test to assess 
that capability under Article 102 TFEU.  The case-law is rife with formulaic statements, such 
as that the conduct of a dominant undertaking does not need to have “a concrete effect on the 
markets concerned”39 or an “actual effect”,40 but that it is “sufficient” to establish an abuse 
that the impugned conduct “tends to restrict competition”,41 or is “capable of having that 
effect”.42  The case-law also talks of conduct “liable to have foreclosure effect”,43 “liable to 
restrict competition”,44 and “liable to produce anti-competitive effects”.45  And in Post 
Danmark II, the Court framed the test in terms of the “likelihood” of the conduct to produce 
anticompetitive effects.46 
The Opinion recommends that the CJEU not stray from the path followed by Post 
Danmark II, and consider the notion of a conduct’s “capability” to produce such effects as 
                                                 
37
 To paraphrase the famous expression of G.J. STIGLER, The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation, 
Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1975, 113: "We may tell the society to jump out of the market frying pan, but 
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 The GC noted at §85 that “exclusivity rebates…are by their very nature capable of restricting competition”. 
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unlawful, the Commission is not required to analyse the capability of those practices to restrict competition 
according to the circumstances of the case at hand”. 
39
 Judgment of 15 March 2007, British Airways v Commission, C-95/04P, EU:C:2007:166, §30 (‘British 
Airways’). 
40
 Judgment of 30 September 2003, Michelin v Commission, T-203/01, EU:T:2003:250, §239 (‘Michelin’). 
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 Judgment of 1 July 2010, AstraZeneca v Commission, T-321/05, EU:T:2010:266, §380. 
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 Judgment of 6 December 2012, AstraZeneca v Commission, C-457/10 P, EU:C:2012:770, §140. 
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equivalent to “likelihood” that the conduct will produce such effects.  In turn, the Opinion 
discusses the degree of likelihood of anticompetitive effects necessary to establish an abuse.47  
AG Wahl suggests that a high probability threshold should be set: the dominant firm’s 
conduct must “in all likelihood” produce anticompetitive effects.  In other words, the required 
degree of likelihood must be “considerably more than a mere possibility”.48  The Opinion 
essentially argues that the standard of likelihood should be high on logical grounds:  
“Although it is certainly true that in its case-law the Court has consistently emphasised the 
special responsibility of dominant undertakings, that responsibility cannot be taken to mean 
that the threshold for the application of the prohibition of abuse laid down in 
Article 102 TFEU can be lowered to such an extent as to become virtually non-existent. That 
would be the case if the degree of likelihood required for ascertaining that the impugned 
conduct amounts to an abuse of a dominant position was nothing more than the mere 
theoretical possibility of an exclusionary effect [...]”.49 
 
Let us add here that the idea that the concept of “capability” necessitates a threshold 
inquiry into effects is far from new in EU competition case-law.  It is present in the case-law 
that discusses effects in relation to trade. As is well-known, the application of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU requires proof that the conduct “may affect trade between Member States”.  And 
the Court has consistently ruled that the assessment of the “effect on trade”50 consists in 
understanding whether trade is “capable of being affected”.51  
In turn, the Court’s case-law explains the type of threshold assessment required to 
establish an effect on trade.  Remia v Commission is the leading case.52  It holds that the 
condition is satisfied if it is “possible to foresee” effects “with a sufficient degree of 
probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact”.53 Since then, the Court has 
repeatedly endorsed a probabilistic understanding of effects.   
In our opinion, the case-law on effects on trade provides insights that could assist the 
Court in the development of its case-law on effects on competition.   
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6. The AEC test is a legality test, not a priority test 
One clear takeaway from the Opinion is that the as-efficient competitor (“AEC”) test 
is a legal standard forming part of the assessment of “all the circumstances” under Article 102 
TFEU, and not merely a “prioritization test”. In the literature, some scholars have interpreted 
the AEC test narrowly as a case-selection tool, noting that an early (though not the earliest) 
formulation of the AEC test had appeared in a Commission soft law instrument titled 
“Guidance Communication on the Commission’s enforcement priorities”. Judiciously 
avoiding referring to it by the name the Commission itself employed – Guidance Paper54 – 
Wouter Wils, for instance, contended: 
“The Priorities Paper clearly states that it is not meant to provide a test for assessing whether 
or not exclusionary conduct violates Article 102 TFEU (legality test), but only a test to be used by the 
Commission to determine, in the context of its priority setting, whether or not a case would be a 
priority case (prioritisation test)”.55 
The deficiency of that argument is that it fails to understand that in the Court’s case-
law, the denomination of an act is not decisive, or even useful, to a determination of its legal 
effects.56 
In Post Danmark II, the Court perfectly understood this, noting that the AEC test is a 
tool “for the purposes of assessing whether there is an abuse”.57  The Opinion espouses a 
similar view, noting that the AEC test “cannot be ignored”, and is “particularly useful” for 
“capturing conduct that has an anticompetitive foreclosure effect”.58   
Against this background, the CJEU should feel sufficiently comfortable to dissipate, 
once and for all, any remaining ambiguity over the nature of the AEC test as a legality 
standard.  In doing so, the Court would ensure the coherence of its case-law across the board.  
Indeed, in both exclusionary and exploitative abuse cases, the Court invariably holds that as 
                                                 
54
 See “Antitrust: consumer welfare at heart of Commission fight against abuses by dominant undertakings”, 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-1877_en.htm?locale=en 
55
 W. P.J. WILS, supra footnote 13, 409. 
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 See N. PETIT, “Intel, Leveraging Rebates and the Goals of Article 102 TFEU”, European Competition Journal 
11.1 (2015): 26-68.  
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 Post Danmark II, supra footnote 7, §61.  The Court explained that the AEC test is not a compulsory method to 
make a finding of Article 102 TFEU liability. See also paragraph 57: “it is not possible to infer from Article 82 
EC or the case-law of the Court that there is a legal obligation requiring a finding to the effect that a rebate 
scheme operated by a dominant undertaking is abusive to be based always on the as-efficient-competitor test”. 
And paragraph 58: “that conclusion ought not to have the effect of excluding, on principle, recourse to the as-
efficient-competitor test in cases involving a rebate scheme for the purposes of examining its compatibility with 
Article 82 EC”. 
58
 Opinion, supra footnote 1,§165. 
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“a general rule”,59 the “costs and the strategy of the dominant undertaking” are a “criterion of 
legality of conduct”.60    
To clarify, we do not advocate in favour of recognising the AEC test as a mandatory 
test in all abuse cases. The AEC test should remain “one tool amongst others”61 for the 
Commission and national competition authorities (unless, of course, they deliberately declare 
that they will use the AEC test in policy statements that generate legitimate expectations, as 
the Commission as done in the Guidance Paper).62  Instead, we believe that the Court should 
follow its conventional approach in relation to tests of legality based on dominant 
undertakings’ costs, namely recognising that an abuse can be established “inter alia”, by an 
AEC test, and recalling that “other ways may be devised […]” of “selecting the rules for 
determining whether the price of a product is unfair” and in turn abusive.63  
 
7. A More Economic Approach to the Enforcement of Article 102 TFEU 
improves Legal Certainty, the Rule of Law and the Uniform Application of EU law 
The idea that a more economic approach to the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU 
would degrade legal certainty and increase enforcement costs is a red herring.64 
Economics provides findings that can help fine-tune the application of the law in areas 
governed by abstract, broad and open-ended legal standards.65  The specification of legal 
rules informed by economics does not only promote legal certainty.  It also gradually 
ameliorates the protection of the “rule of law” by limiting arbitrariness.  And the design of 
such legal rules ensures the “uniform application of Union law” in the “interlocking system of 
jurisdiction between the Union courts and national courts”.66  Overall, this benefits 
defendants and complainants, agencies, courts and dominant firms, consumers and suppliers. 
                                                 
59
 Judgment of 17 February 2011, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, Case C-52/09, EU:C:2011:83, 
§41: “reference should be made, as a general rule, to pricing criteria based on the costs incurred by the 
dominant undertaking itself and on its strategy”. 
60
 Judgment of 3 July 1991, AKZO Chemie v Commission, C-62/86, EU:C:1991:286, §63 and following. See 
judgment of 14 February 1978, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal v Commission, 27/76, 
EU:C:1978:22, §§250-253 ('United Brands').  
61
 Post Danmark II, supra footnote 7, §61. 
62
 See N. PETIT, “Rebates and article 102 TFEU: The European Commission’s duty to apply the guidance 
paper”, Competition Law & Policy Debate, Vol. 2 Issue 1, March 2016, 4.  
63
 United Brands, §253, in relation to unfair pricing abuses. 
64
 See, for such a proposition, W. P.J. WILS, supra footnote 13, 427. 
65
 See for a discussion of the concept of “standards” and “rules”, D. KENNEDY, “Form and Substance in 
Private Law Adjudication”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 89, 1976, 1687-1713 (talking of a “formal mode [that] 
favors the use of clearly defined, highly administrable, general rules”); See also, D.A. CRANE, “Rules Versus 
Standards in Antitrust Adjudication.” Washington & Lee Law Review, 64(1), 2007, 55. 
66
 See K. LENAERTS, “The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union” 
Common Market Law Review, 44: 1625–1659, 2007. 
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Let us focus here on legal certainty only.  No one can deny that the CJEU made the 
law less arbitrary when it injected economics into the interpretation of the notions of 
“concerted practice” in Woodpulp,67 “collective dominant position” in Bertelsmann AG v. 
Impala,68 and restrictions “by object” in Groupement des Cartes Bancaires.69 
The Opinion is important because it invites the Court to move the law of Article 102 
TFEU exactly in the same direction, noting that “Experience and economic analysis do not 
unequivocally suggest that loyalty rebates are, as a rule, harmful or anticompetitive, even 
when offered by dominant undertakings”.70  
The Intel v Commission appeal before the CJEU thus presents a potential Woodpulp/ 
Bertelsmann AG v. Impala/ Groupement des Cartes Bancaires moment. The Court should 
seize it.  
 
8. Why a More Economic Approach does not entail more Mathematics 
The claim that a more economic approach transforms competition enforcement into an 
exercise in quantitative mathematics is an intellectual fiction.71  In recent years, the 
competition economics profession has itself been careful to avoid having its discipline being 
caricatured as a “sophisticated” branch of “hard science”.72  Foreseeing a risk that courts and 
agencies could be prompted to marginalise the influence of economics in day to day 
competition policy, Simon Bishop, a seasoned EU competition economist, wrote an article in 
2013 with the unequivocal title “Snake-oil with mathematics is still snake-oil”.  The paper 
called upon the author’s peers to focus on “good practical economics”, and aim for “clarity in 
the application of sound, well-established economic principles, firmly rooted in and tested 
against observed market evidence”.73  Such core, well-established principles include the 
propositions that cartels are wholly inefficient, that scale (or size) is not necessarily adverse to 
                                                 
67
 Judgment of 31 March 1993,  A Åhlštröm Osakeyhtiö a. o. v.  Commission, C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-
116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85, EU:C:1993:120, §71. 
68
 Judgment of 10 July 2008, Bertelsmann AG v. Impala, C-413/06 P, EU:C:2008:392. 
69
 Judgment of 11 September 2014, Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v Commission, C-67/13P, 
EU:C:2014:2204. 
70
 Opinion, supra footnote 1, §90. 
71
 See, for expression of this idea, WILS, supra footnote 13. 
72
 See S. BISHOP, Snake-Oil with Mathematics is still Snake-oil: Why Recent Trends in the Application of So-
Called Sophisticated Economics is Hindering Good Competition Policy Enforcement”, European Competition 
Journal, Vol.1, 2013, 68 (writing: “Let me make an obvious but often forgotten observation: economics is a 
social science; it is not a hard science. In contrast to physics, say, economics is unable to conduct proper 
replicable controlled experiments.”). 
73
 Id., 77. 
14 
 
welfare, that prices below marginal costs are generally irrational, that firms respond to 
incentives, that profits trigger market entry, etc.74   
Aiming for clarity in the application of sound, well established economic principles is 
precisely the direction that the Opinion proposes to follow. This involves beginning with the 
default principle that “rebates enhance rivalry, the very essence of competition”,75 and 
applying a context-dependent framework of analysis in line with what the “contemporary 
economic literature commonly emphasizes”.76  There is nothing mathematic, quantitative or 
sophisticated about this. 
 
Conclusion 
The Intel v Commission appeal gives the CJEU an opportunity to ensure the much-
needed coherence of its case-law.  The Court can fix the last remnants of Article 102 TFEU 
law that are divorced from the teachings of basic competition economics and defy logic.  
Within the rich Opinion produced by AG Wahl, we submit that the eight key points discussed 
above deserve particular attention. 
The Court has already advanced on this journey in Post Danmark I and II.  Assuming 
(but who knows?) that there will be no Post Danmark III reference, Intel v Commission is the 
ideal case to bring about the reconciliation of Article 102 TFEU law with logic and common 
sense.   
It is immaterial that Intel v Commission occurs in the context of an appeal of a GC 
judgment, and not in a preliminary ruling setting.  In the past, the CJEU has often developed 
the law of competition in a judicial review context.  Woodpulp, Bertelsmann AG v. Impala 
and Groupement des Cartes Bancaires are cases in point.   May the “supreme court” of the 
EU have those insightful judgments in mind as it is asked to give “the last word” on Article 






                                                 
74
 Those principles may well suffer from derogations. But legal principles also have exceptions.  So this 
objection cannot be a reason to discard the use of economics in the design of legal rules.  
75
 Opinion, supra footnote 1, §90.  
76
 Opinion, supra footnote 1, §§94 and 95. 
77
 See K. LENAERTS, supra note 64 pp.1651 and 1652. 
